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Comment
FEDERALISM AND A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal ....
Declaration of Independence
I. INTRODUCTION
It is indeed ironic that our nation, founded on the basic premise of
human equality, had no constitutional requirement of equal treatment under
the law until the post-Civil War amendments, 1 nearly a century after its
birth. Following the passage of these amendments, the Supreme Court
gradually developed a body of equal protection law that restricted dis-
criminatory actions by state governments in a variety of contexts. 2
In contrast, there was no equivalent restriction on the federal govern-
ment until 1954. In that year, the Supreme Court, in Bolling v. Sharpe,3
held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment included concepts of
equal protection. 4 The question of the degree of incorporation of equal pro-
1. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
were passed in response to social conditions existing during the period of the Civil War. See
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1873). The thirteenth amendment,
adopted in 1865, prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The
fifteenth amendment, adopted in 1870, prohibits the denial of the right to vote on the basis of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV. Adopted in 1868, the
fourteenth amendment, inter alia, instituted the requirement that the states provide equal pro-
tection under the laws to all people within their jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. That
amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
2. For a review of the development of equal protection law, see notes 10-26 and accom-
panying text infra.
3. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
4. Id. at 499. Bolling involved a challenge to segregation in the public schools of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Id. at 498. It was decided on the same day as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), the pioneer school desegregation case. Boiling was not controlled by Brown
since the District of Columbia is governed by the federal government and, consequently, the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment are not applicable. 347 U.S. at 499.
However, the Bolling Court held that racial segregation in the District of Columbia public
schools violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which operates as a restriction
on federal action. Id. at 500. That amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
• . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Court based its holding on the intolerability of invidious racial discrimination. 347 U.S. at
499-500. The Court stated:
Classification based solely on race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they
are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. . . . [T]his Court de-
clared the principle "that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, for-
bids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General
Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race."
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.
Id. (footnotes omitted), quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896).
(557)
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tection principles into the fifth amendment due process clause, however,
was left for future determination.5
This comment will examine the effect of the equal protection require-
ment on the federal government, particularly in the context of recent Su-
preme Court decisions concerning classifications of aliens 6 and illegitimates.
7
Consideration will also be given to the degree to which equal protection law
is influenced by the federal system8 in which it operates. 9
II. OVERVIEW OF EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
It is appropriate to begin with a brief examination of the development of
equal protection law and of the standards of judicial review which the Su-
preme Court currently applies. Morespecifically, it is essential to focus upon
the different levels of scrutiny invoked in the Court's analysis of various
legislative classifications.
Early equal protection law focused solely upon the means which had
been chosen to accomplish a state legislature's objectives. 10 A statute gen-
erally withstood judicial review if the classification made by the law was
reasonably related to a legislative purpose." This type of equal protection
review was commonly called the "rational basis test." 12 Classifications
based on race were the one major exception to this rule, and received far
5. The Court maintained that although concepts of equal protection were incorporated, to
some extent, in the fifth amendment due process clause, the two were not equivalent. 347 U.S.
at 499-500. Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
[Tihe concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our Ameri-
can ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a
more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore,
we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has
recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Id. at 499. For a discussion of the degree of incorporation of equal protection principles into the
due process clause, see notes 159-70 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 94-154 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 33-93 and accompanying text infra.
8. A system of federalism is one in which several states are organized under the control of
a central government, distinct from the individual governments of the separate states. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 740 (4th ed. 1968).
9. This issue revolves around the question of whether constitutional restrictions on the
powers of government are equally applicable to all levels of government operating in the
federalist system. For a discussion of the role of federalism in equal protection law, see notes
159-97 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911). See C. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 657-58, 666-67 (9th ed. 1975); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341-56 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Equal Protection].
II. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 657-58,
666-67; Equal Protection, supra note 10, at 341-56. Cf. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v, Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920) (rational basis test applied but statute found unconstitutional).
12. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 352 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968). More recently, this type of review has also been labelled the "minimum" or "mere"
rationality test. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
[VOL. 24: p. 557
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less deferential treatment by the courts. 13 The "strict scrutiny" of racial clas-
sifications had its origin in the fact that racial prejudice in state laws was the
obvious target of the post-Civil War amendments.14
In the 1960's, under the Warren Court, a two-tiered approach to equal
protection analysis evolved which requires the identification of the class dis-
criminated against or the'interest affected by the classification.1 5 Under this
approach, characterization of a class as "suspect" 16 or an interest as "funda-
mental" 17 would invoke "strict scrutiny" by the Court, which would trigger
an intensive review of the objectives sought to be achieved by the legisla-
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially segregated schools
found unconstitutional); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (detainment of Ameri-
cans of Japanese ancestry during World War II justified only by the extreme exigencies of war);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (state law barring Negroes from jury duty found
unconstitutional). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 657, 665-66; Equal Protection, supra note
10, at 356.
14. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1873).
15. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 658-59; Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972);
Developmnents in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-133 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Developments]. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segrega-
tion in public schools based on race, a suspect class, declared unconstitutional) with Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (business regulation classifying some opticians differ-
ently than others upheld as a legitimate exercise of legislative power).
16. Race remained the major suspect class. For the latest reaffirmation of this position, see
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). In addition, classifications based
on alienage were eventually determined to be suspect, although this pronouncement came from
the Burger Court rather than from the Warren Court. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). Justice Blackmun, writing for the Graham Court, stated:
[T]he Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular" minority ... for
whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate. Accordingly .... "the power of a
state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within
narrow limits."
Id. at 371-72 (citations and footnotes omitted), quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). For a discussion of Graham, see notes 94-104 and accompany-
ing text infra. It should be noted that the Supreme Court may have retreated from this posi-
tion. See Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978). For discussion of Foley, see notes 138-54 and
accompanying text infra.
There was also dicta in several Warren Court opinions to the effect that classifications based
on wealth were suspect. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807
(1969) ("a careful examination ...is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of
wealth or race"); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, ...are traditionally disfavored.") Subsequent
decisions of the Burger Court, however, rejected this dicta and refused to designate wealth a
suspect classification. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
A plurality of the Burger Court did label sex as a suspect classification in one decision. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). For a discussion of suspect classifications, see
generally Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 693-95(1977).
17. This area of equal protection law involved classifications which affected fundamental
rights or interests found to be implicit in the Constitution. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to the courts for divorce proceedings); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(the right to vote). See generally Bice, supra note 16, at 695-98.
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ture, the means selected to achieve these ends, and the congruence between
the two.18 In contrast, any other classification would invoke the traditional
deferential review. 1 9
The Burger Court, however, has initiated a withdrawal from the ex-
tremes of the Warren Court's two-tiered approach.20  The Court has stead-
fastly refused to augment the list of suspect classes or fundamental
interests.2 1  In addition, the Court has created a new middle standard, com-
monly labelled "minimum scrutiny with bite."-2 2  Moreover, the Burger
Court has often been less deferential in applying the "rational basis" test.
23
In summary, current equal protection law encompasses a number of
different standards, with each type of classification theoretically triggering a
corresponding standard of review.2 4 Within a specific type of classification,
however, the enunciated standard is not always uniformly applied. 25  In-
18. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See Gunther, supra note 15, at 8-10.
The invocation of strict scrutiny had a substantial effect on the Court's equal protection analysis.
The usual presumption of constitutionality was reversed, and the state, rather than the chal-
lenger, had to sustain the burden of proof. ld. Moreover, the Court would not accept a
hypothetical basis for the state action, but rather required the demonstration of a "compelling"
state interest and means absolutely necessary to accomplish the legislative ends. Id. Once strict
scrutiny was invoked, the result was almost always fatal to the challenged statute or other
government action. See id. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (sustaining
the exclusion of persons of Japanese origin from the west coast of the United States during
World War II for compelling military reasons).
19. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Gunther, supra note 15, at
8-10; Developments, supra note 15, at 1076-133. See generally Bice, supra note 16, at 698-702.
20. See Gunther, supra note 15, at 17-40; Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the
Burger Court, 53 DEN. L.J. 687, 697-702 (1976).
21. See Gunther, supra note 15, at 12-16; Note, supra note 20, at 689-97.
22. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Gunther, supra note 15, at 18-40; Note,
supra note 20, at 712-29. For a discussion of Trimble, see notes 70-83 and accompanying text
infra.
23. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 661-62. Compare McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (Warren Court decision sustaining a denial of absentee ballots to
qualified voters imprisoned in the county jail while awaiting trial, while other classes of voters
were provided with absentee ballots) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Warren
Court rejection of equal protection challenge to state's Sunday closing laws which exempted
certain products from the ban) with Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Burger
Court, while applying the minimum rationality test, invalidated a Social Security Act provision
which paid benefits to widows but not to widowers) and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(Burger Court decision invalidating state preference for men over women as administrators of
estates while purporting to apply the traditional minimum rationality standard).
24. For example, race is still a suspect classification invoking strict scrutiny. See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). Illegitimacy classifications are not suspect,
but do trigger minimum scrutiny with bite. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Gen-
der based classifications are apparently subject to the "mere rationality" standard, but the test is
far less deferential than the traditional rationality standard. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (plurality opinion of four Justices would make gender based classifications suspect).
25. For a discussion of the lack of uniformity in applying the tests involving illegitimacy and
alienage classifications, see notes 33-93 (illegitimacy) & 94-154 (alienage) and accompanying text
infra. For an example of this lack of consistency in the context of gender based classifications,
compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating statute requiring service-
women to prove the dependence of their husbands before they were entitled to increased ben-
efits, but which contained no similar requirement for servicemen) with Schlesinger v. Ballard,
[VOL. 24: p. 557
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deed, Justice Marshall has gone so far as to suggest that the Court currently
utilizes a "sliding scale" approach, applying a spectrum of standards depend-
ing on the nature of the classification and the importance of the interests
infringed upon. 26
II1. RECENT TRENDS
Equal protection challenges arise in a variety of situations. Classifica-
tions based on race are frequently the subject of litigation and are often
challenged successfully. 27  Moreover, the constitutional doctrines with
respect to race based classifications are fairly explicit and consistent. 28 In con-
trast, classifications based on sex are currently generating a number of chal-
lenges, and have resulted in a plethora of varying and sometimes inconsis-
tent responses from the Court. 29
419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding military promotion system which granted women in Navy a
tenure of thirteen years before being subject to discharge for lack of promotion, but which
provided no such tenure for men).
26. Justice Marshall has urged that the Court's equal protection decisions reveal the applica-
tion of a variety of standards, including strict scrutiny and the rational basis test. See San An-
tonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). He has contended that the Court should explicitly adopt this flexible approach. Id. at
98-99, 108-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Rodriguez, Justice Marshall stated:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of
two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or
mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the
Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of
care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe,
on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. I
find in fact that many of the Court's recent decisions embody the very sort of reasoned
approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously argued ...
Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice White also appears to have endorsed this "sliding scale" theory. See Vandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the "sliding
scale" approach, see Note, supra note 20, at 716-17.
27. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. This is probably due to the fact that the post-Civil War amendments were aimed specif-
ically at racial discrimination, and therefore race has traditionally been considered a suspect
class. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra. One
controversial area involving race based classifications is affirmative action. See notes 195-97 and
accompanying text infra.
29. Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding unconstitutional the dispa-
rate treatment of widows and widowers for federal old age benefits) with Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of system of computing social security benefits
which provided higher benefits to females). There is even uncertainty as to the proper test to
be applied. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (middle level scrutiny requiring
"important governmental objectives" and substantial relationship towards achievement of those
objectives) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality identifying sex as a
suspect class) with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rational basis test).
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There are two lines of cases, however, of fairly recent origin, which
clearly illustrate a federal-state distinction in the Court's equal protection
analysis. The first class of cases involves challenges to discriminatory treat-
ment of illegitimates.30  The second line of cases concerns the application of
the equal protection principles to classifications involving aliens .3  Both of
these classes of cases contain indications that the Supreme Court is willing to
be more deferential to federal mandates than to those of the states.
3 2
A. Classifications Involving Illegitimates
This area of equal protection law originated with the companion cases of
Levy v. Louisiana33 and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insur-
ance Co.3 4  Levy and Glona involved separate challenges to the Louisiana
wrongful death statute 3 5 which barred unacknowledged 3 6 illegitimate chil-
dren from recovering for the death of their mother, and prohibited a mother
from recovering for the death of her unacknowledged illegitimate chil-
dren.3 7 Having concluded that the equal protection clause applied to clas-
sifications involving illegitimates,3 8 the Court determined that the rational
basis test was the appropriate standard to be applied. 3 9
In applying the rational basis test to the challenged statute, the Levy
majority recognized the usual deference given to state legislatures in the
social and economic area, 40 but also reiterated the Court's sensitivity to clas-
sifications involving basic civil rights. 41 The Court concluded that since an
intimate, familial relationship was involved, 42 and since the question of
legitimacy bore no relationship to the wrong allegedly inflicted upon the
30. See notes 33-93 and accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 94-154 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 155-97 and accompanying text infra.
33. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
34. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
35. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1972).
36. Under Louisiana law, acknowledgment occurs when the parent publicly and formally
admits responsibility for the child. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 203 (West 1972). It can occur
voluntarily or through court proceedings. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 203, 208 (West 1972). See
also Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74-75 & n.7 (1968). In order to
effectively acknowledge a child, the natural parents must be legally capable of marrying at the
time of the acknowledgment, or have actually married subsequent to the acknowledgment. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 204 (West 1972).
37. Levy concerned the right of the child to recover for the death of the mother. 391 U.S.
at 69-70. The companion case, Glona, involved the right of a mother to recover for the death of
her illegitimate child. 391 U.S. at 73-74.
38. 391 U.S. at 70. The Court stated: "We start from the premise that illegitimate children
are not 'nonpersons.' They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly 'persons'
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).
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mother, 43 the statute was unconstitutional.44 Similarly, in Glona, the major-
ity held that the statute was not rationally related to the asserted purpose of
discouraging illegitimacy.
4 5
Three years later, in Labine v. Vincent,4 6 the Court apparently re-
treated from its position in Levy. 4 7  Labine involved a challenge to a
Louisiana interstate succession provision 4 8 which subordinated the rights of
acknowledged 49 illegitimate children to those of legitimates and other rela-
tives of the deceased parent. 50  The Labine majority 51 questioned the ap-
propriateness of any equal protection review, 52 but nevertheless concluded
that the statute clearly met the rationality standard.
53
43. Id. The Court explained:
These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and
nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her
death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.
We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against them when no action, con-
duct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.
Id. at 72 (footnotes omitted).
44. 1d. at 72.
45. Id. at 75-76. The Glona Court applied the rational basis test. Id. The majority opinion,
written by Justice Douglas, concluded:
[W]e see no possible rational basis ...for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed
recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be
served. It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children
so that they can be compensated in damages for their death.
Id. at 75 (citations omitted).
In a dissent to Levy and Glona, Justice Harlan, in an opinion joined by Justices Black and
Stewart, labelled the Court's decisions "constitutional curiosities." Id. at 76 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). Disagreeing with the conclusions of the majority and the degree of rigor with which the
rationality test was applied, Justice Harlan stated:
The question in these cases is whether the way in which Louisiana has defined the classes
of persons who may recover is constitutionally permissible. The Court has reached a nega-
tive answer to this question by a process that can only be described as brute force.
The Court today, for some reason which I am at a loss to understand, rules that a
State must base its arbitrary definition of the plaintiff class on biological rather than legal
relationships. Exactly how this makes the Louisiana scheme even marginally more ra-
tional" is not clear, for neither a biological relationship nor legal acknowledgment is in-
dicative of the love or economic dependence that may exist between two persons.
Id. at 76, 79-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
47. The Court distinguished Labine from Levy and Glona on two bases. First, the Court
noted the traditional state interest in intestate succession laws. Id. at 535-38. Secondly, the
Court reasoned that the provision challenged in Labine did not provide an "insurmountable
barrier" to the illegitimate child, since the parent could have provided for the child by will. Id.
at 539.
48. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1972).
49. Recall that acknowledged illegitimate children were not excluded under the wrongful
death statute involved in Levy and Glona. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
50. 401 U.S. at 534.
51. The Labine majority consisted of the dissenters in Levy plus the two most recent ap-
pointees to the Court at that time, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
52. 401 U.S. at 535-39. The majority asserted:
[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to
regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there is committed
1978-1979] COMMENT
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In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,5 4 the Court invalidated a
state workman's compensation statute which discriminated against illegiti-
mates.55 The Court distinguished Labine, relying on the fact that the provi-
sion challenged in Weber provided an "insurmountable barrier" to the
illegitimate child which was absent in Labine.56 The majority opinion in
Weber 57 did not clearly enunciate the appropriate standard of review,"' but
concluded that no justification existed for the statutory classification regard-
less of which test was applied. 59 The dissent argued that the rational rela-
[to] the legislature of that State. Absent a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that
legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from among possible laws.
Id. at 538-39 (footnote omitted).
53. The Court stated: "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test, [the] statute clearly
has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting family life and of directing the
disposition of property left within the State." Id. at 535 n.6.
54. ,406 U.S. 164 (1972).
55. Id. at 165. The challenged statute was Louisiana's Workman's Compensation Act, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1232 (West 1964), which gave priority of recovery to legitimate children
and acknowledged illegitimates over unacknowledged illegitimate children. Id.
56. 406 U.S. at 170. An "insurmountable barrier" was considered to be present because
under Louisiana law the father could not have acknowledged the illegitimate children even if he
had desired to do so. As the Court explained:
[Louisiana law] prohibits acknowledgment of children whose parents were incapable of
contracting marriage at the time of conception. Acknowledgment may only be made if the
parents could contract a legal marriage with each other. Decedent in the instant case
remained married to his first wife-the mother of his four legitimate children-until his
death. Thus, at all times he was legally barred from marrying ...the mother of the two
illegitimate children. It therefore was impossible for him to acknowledge legally his il-
legitimate children and thereby qualify them for protection under the Louisiana Work-
men's Compensation Act.
406 U.S. at 171 n.9, construing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 204 (West 1972). The children in
Weber were therefore barred from recovery even if they were, in fact, dependent on their
father. This situation can be contrasted to that presented in Labine, where the parent could
have provided for the illegitimate child by will in order to avoid the harsh result under the
intestacy law. For a discussion of Labine, see notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of acknowledgment of illegitimate children und(r Louisiana law, see note 36, supra.
The Weber Court further distinguished Labine as resting on the "traditional deference to a
State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders." 406.U.S.
at 170 (citation omitted).
57. The majority opinion was written by Justice Powell.
58. Justice Powell stated:
The tests to determine the validity of state statutes tinder the Equal Protection Clause
have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory
classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. . . .Though the
latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, when statutory
classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a
stricter scrutiny. . . .The essential inquiry ...is, however, inevitably a dual one: What
legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?
406 U.S. at 172-73 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 175-76. Justice Powell reasoned: "Courts are powerless to prevent the social op-
probrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to
strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where-as in this case-the classifica-
tion is justified by no legitimate statc interest, compelling or otherwise." Id. (footnote omitted).
In his discussion, Justice Powell apparently analogized illegitimacy to other suspect classes, such
as race and alienage. See id.
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tionship test was appropriate, and that the statute satisfied that standard of
review.60
Four years later, the trend established by the Court changed direction.
In Mathews v. Lucas'6 1 the Court sustained a Social Security Act provision 62
which operated to the disadvantage of some illegitimates. 63 The majority in
Lucas rejected strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard 64 and distin-
guished prior decisions, invalidating illegitimacy classifications. 65 Applying
the minimum rationality test, the Court found the provision justified by ad-
ministrative convenience. 66  The dissenters 67 would have required more
than minimum rationality, 68 although they did not assert that strict scrutiny
was appropriate.
69
60. Id. at 177-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. He
maintained that the statutory provision at issue in Weber, as well as the provision in Levy,
satisfied the rational relationship test. Id. at 184-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1976).
63. 427 U.S. at 516. The provision governed a surviving child's insurance benefits. Id. at
497-99. The benefits were provided to children who were dependents at the time of their
parent's death. Id. at 498. Legitimate children, and illegitimates who met certain criteria, such
as entitlement to inherit under state law or written acknowledgment of paternity, were not
required to prove dependence. Id. at 498-99. All other illegitimates were subjected to indi-
vidualized proof of dependency as a condition to entitlement to benefits. Id.
64. id. at 504-05. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated:
It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or
national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the il-
legitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in
and contribute to society. . . . []uch irrationality in some classifications does not in itself
demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made in part on the basis of legiti-
macy are inherently untenable ...
We therefore adhere to our earlier view ... that the Act's discrimination between
individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not "command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process."
Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 511. In distinguishing Levy and Weber, Justice Blackmun noted that the statutes
challenged in those cases provided an "insurmountable barrier" to the illegitimates, causing
them to be totally shut out from benefits. Id. For a discussion of Levy, see notes 33-45 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Weber, see notes 54-60 and accompanying text
supra. In contrast, under the provision at issue in Lucas, the question of legitimacy was simply
regarded as an indication of dependency, which was considered a valid ground of qualification.
427 U.S. at 511.
66. 427 U.S. at 509. In describing this asserted interest, the Court stated:
Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obvi-
ously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to assume that
every child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming
dependency on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth,
or existence of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indi-
cate the likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid the bur-
den and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number of cases
where dependency is objectively probable.
Id. The administrative convenience justification, however, has not generally been favored by
the Court. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974).
67. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined.
68. 427 U.S. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued:
[A] traditional classification is more likely to be used without pausing to consider its jus-
tification than is a newly created classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem
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Finally, in 1977, in two cases decided on the same day, the Court sus-
tained a challenge to a state intestacy statute and rejected an attack on a
classification under federal immigration law. In Trimble v. Gordon,70 the
plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Illinois Probate Code 7' which allowed
all children to inherit by intestate succession from their mothers, but only
permitted legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from their
natural fathers. 72  A sharply divided Court 73 found the provision uncon-
stitutional. 74
While recognizing that illegitimates as a class share many characteristics
with other suspect classes, 75 the Court declined to find that illegitimacy was
a suspect class. 76 While rejecting strict scrutiny, however, the Court as-
serted that the appropriate level of review "is not a toothless one." 7 7
acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legiti-
mate and illegitimate; for too much of our history, there was the same inertia in distin-
guishing between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no
rational relationship-other than pure prejudicial discrimination-to the stated purpose
for which the classification is made.
Whether the classification is expressed in terms of eligible classes or in terms of
presumptions of dependency, the fact remains that legitimacy, written acknowledgments,
or state law make eligible many children who are no more likely to be "dependent" than
are the children in appellees' situation. Yet in the name of "administrative convenience"
the Court allows these survivors' benefits to be allocated on grounds which have only the
most tenuous connection to the supposedly controlling factor-the child's dependency on
his father.
I am persuaded that the classification which is sustained today in the name of "ad-
ministrative convenience" is more probably the product of a tradition of thinking of il-
legitimates as less deserving persons than legitimates. The sovereign should firmly reject
that tradition. The fact that illegitimacy is not as apparent to the observer as sex or race
does not make this governmental classification any less odious. It cannot be denied that it
is a source of social opprobrium, even if wholly unmerited, or that it is a circumstance for
which the individual has no responsibility whatsoever.
Id. at 520-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
The dissenters also rejected the majority's administrative convenience argument. Id. at
516-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They found Lucas to be indistinguishable from cases in which
that justification had been rejected. Id. (citations omitted). The dissenters also believed that the
majority had "unfairly evaluate[d] the competing interests at stake." Id. at 517 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
69. Nowhere in the opinion did Justice Stevens use the traditional "suspect class" or "strict
scrutiny" language. He did state that the Court "should be especially vigilant in examining"
illegitimacy classifications. Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In reviewing the provision, Jus-
tice Stevens considered whether the classifications "actually bear any substantial relationship to
the fact of dependency," and concluded that they did not. Id. at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (1976).
72. 430 U.S. at 764-65.
73. Trimble was a 5-4 decision. Justice Powell wrote for the majority, joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist dissented.
74. 430 U.S. at 765-66.
75. Id. at 767.
76. Id.
77. Id., quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
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The Trimble majority determined that the purpose of the statutory pro-
vision was to ameliorate the harsh common law regarding illegitimates, 78 and
concluded that the remaining discrimination must be considered in light of
this purpose. 79  After reviewing the justifications which the Supreme Court
of Illinois had accepted in upholding the statute,8 0 and considering an addi-
tional justification offered by the state, 8 the majority concluded that the
provision violated the equal protection clause.8 2  The dissenters maintained
that Trimble was indistinguishable from Labine, and hence considered the
statute to be constitutional. 83
Decided on the same day as Trimble was Fiallo v. Bell. 84  The statute
challenged in Fiallo was a federal immigration law which had the effect of
excluding the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural
father from the special preference immigration status accorded a child or
78. 430 U.S. at 768. The Supreme Court accepted the determination of the Supreme Court
of Illinois that this was in fact the purpose of the statute. Id. at 767-68. At common law, an
illegitimate child was incapable of inheriting from either parent. Id. at 768.
79. Id. at 768.
80. Id. at 768-74. The Supreme Court of Illinois had found three major justifications for the
law. Id. The first was the purported state interest in promoting legitimate family relationships.
Id. at 768. The Supreme Court rejected this justification because it found that the provision
bore "only the most attenuated relationship to the asserted goal." Id. The Court elaborated by
stating: "[W]e have expressly considered and rejected the argument that a State may attempt to
influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their
illegitimate relationships." Id. at 769.
The Supreme Court of Illinois had also relied on the state's interest in establishing an
accurate method of property distribution, and was concerned with the difficulty of proving
paternity, particularly after the death of the alleged father. Id. at 770. While recognizing that
this was a legitimate concern, the Supreme Court determined that the total exclusion of il-
legitimates from intestate inheritance from their fathers was irrational when a middle ground
would have effectively protected this state interest. Id. at 770-72. The Court stated: "Difficul-
ties of proving paternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of
illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate." Id. at 772.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Illinois, relying on Labine, had noted the lack of any insur-
mountable barrier, since the father could always have provided for the illegitimate child by will.
Id. at 773. The Trimble Court, while recognizing that this argument had some support in earlier
decisions, rejected it in the case at bar, stating:
Despite its appearance in two of our opinions, the focus on the presence or absence
of an insurmountable barrier is somewhat of an analytical anomaly. . . .Traditional equal
protection analysis asks whether this statutory differentiation on the basis of illegitimacy is
justified by the promotion of recognized state objectives. If the law cannot be sustained
on this analysis, it is not clear how it can be saved by the absence of an insurmountable
barrier to inheritance under other and hypothetical circumstances.
Id. at 773-74.
81. Id. at 774. The state urged that the provision reflected the presumed intention of the
citizens of the state as to the disposition of their property at death. Id. The Court also rejected
this justification, reasoning that the failure of the Supreme Court of Illinois to address this
argument in its opinion indicated "that the statutory provisions were shaped by forces other
than the desire of the legislature to mirror the intentions of the citizens of the state with respect
to their illegitimate children." Id. at 775-76.
82. Id. at 776.
83. Id. at 776-77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist in a separate dissent, argued
that the equal protection clause was intended to have a much narrower meaning than that given
it by the majority and that the scope of the clause was being unnecessarily broadened by the
Court. Id. at 777-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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parent of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. 85  The
majority 8" initially noted the limited scope of judicial review in immigration
cases, 8 7 and rejected arguments that this traditional standard should be ex-
panded. 88
Apparently applying a highly deferential rationality test, 89 the majority
found the statute constitutional.9 0  The dissenters9 ' asserted that.the statute
discriminated among United States citizens and that a less deferential stan-
dard of review was therefore appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the
85. Id. at 788-90. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(D), 1101(b)(2) (1976). The relationship between
an illegitimate child and his natural mother was included within the special preference status.
430 U.S. at 788.
86. Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion in Trimble, also wrote for the majority in
Fiallo. He was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stevens.
87. 430 U.S. at 792. The Court noted that "in the exercise of its broad power over immigra-
tion and naturalization, 'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."' Id., quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
88. 430 U.S. at 793-96. The plaintiffs offered several arguments in support of the imposition
of a higher level of judicial scrutiny than is usually applied in immigration cases. Id. First, they
argued that since the purpose of the statute was to reunite families whenever possible, the
statute afforded rights to United States citizens and legal permanent residents rather than to
aliens. Id. at 793. Consequently, the plaintiffs urged that the Court closely scrutinize the
enactment in order "to protect against violations of the rights of citizens." Id. at 793-94. This
argument was adopted by the dissenters. See note 92 and accompanying text infra. The major-
ity, however, summarily rejected the plaintiffs' contention. 430 U.S. at 794.
Secondly, the plaintiffs urged that the statute involved " 'double-barreled' discrimination
based on sex and illegitimacy," and that it infringed upon "the fundamental constitutional in-
terests of United States citizens and permanent residents in a familial relationship." Id. In
response to these arguments, the Court noted that it had declined a more searching review in
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 430 U.S. at 794-95. Kleindienst involved the refusal
of a visa to a communist sympathizer, challenged on first amendment grounds by the applicant
and citizens of the United States who supported him. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 754-
59. The Kleindienst Court stated:
[W]hen the Executive exercises this power [the right to refuse a visa to a communist
sympathizer] negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communi-
cation with the applicant.
Id. at 770. The Fiallo majority found this language dispositive, stating: "We can see no reason
to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard
than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case." 430 U.S. at 795.
Finally, the plaintiffs urged that the deferential standard should only apply where the
exclusionary policy was aimed at protecting a threat to national security. Id. at 796. The major-
ity summarily dismissed this contention, stating: "We find no indication in our prior cases that
the scope0 of judicial review is a function of the nature of the policy choice at issue." Id.
89. The Fiallo Court never actually expressed the standard of review being employed. The
majority, however, frequently described the scope of review as being very narrow. See 430 U.S.
at 792-99. The Court further stated that "it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe
and test the justification for the legislative decisions." Id. at 799 (footnote omitted). It would
thus appear that the Court applied the deferential rationality test commonly employed by the
Warren Court. See notes 11 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
90. 430 U.S. at 799-800.
91. Justice Marshall wrote' a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice
White wrote a separate, one sentence dissenting opinion in which lie dissented for "substan-
tially the same reasons" as Justice Marshall.
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classification appeared in the immigration laws. 92 Moreover, the dissenters
also would have found the statute unconstitutional under the test applied in
Trimble. 93
B. Classifications Involving Aliens
The modern line of cases in this area of equal protection law began with
Graham v. Richardson.94 Graham involved challenges to several state stat-
utes which denied welfare benefits to resident aliens who had not resided in
the United States for a specified period of years. 95 The states argued that
the statutes did not contain invidious classifications because the legislatures
were not classifying with respect to race or nationality. 96
The Court first found that aliens were entitled to the protection of the
fourteenth amendment. 98  After noting the deference traditionally accorded
the states in the area of economics and social welfare, 99 the Court indicated
that aliens were a suspect class entitled to "heightened judicial solici-
tude."100 While conceding that various statutory provisions which imposed
disabilities upon aliens had been upheld in the past, 1° 1 the Court in Graham
rejected all of the proffered justifications for the statutes before them. 102
92. 430 U.S. at 800-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued:
Until today I thought it clear that when Congress grants benefits to some citizens,
but not to others, it is our duty to insure that the decision comports with Fifth Amend-
ment principles of due process and equal protection. Today, however, the Court appears
to hold that discrimination among citizens, however invidious and irrational, must be
tolerated if it occurs in the context of immigration laws.
Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 809-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For an explanation of the standard of review
applied in Trimble, see text accompanying notes 75-77 supra. Justice Marshall summa-
rized: "Once it is established that this discrimination among citizens cannot escape traditional
constitutional scrutiny simply because it occurs in the context of immigration legislation, the
result is virtually foreordained. One can hardly imagine a more vulnerable statute." 430 U.S. at
809 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
95. Id. at 367. Two cases were consolidated for this decision. The first originated in Arizona,
and involved that state's program for assistance to persons who were permanently and totally
disabled. Id. See Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1972) (amended 1972). The program was
supported in part by federal grants and was administered by the states under federal guidelines.
403 U.S. at 367. Assistance was conditioned on United States citizenship or residency in the
United States for a period of 15 years. Id.
The second case involved Pennsylvania's general assistance program, which was not feder-
ally supported. Id. at 368. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 62-432 (Purdon 1974). The statute
denied benefits to noncitizens. 403 U.S. at 368.
96. 403 U.S. at 370.
97. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Harlan joined in thie unani-
mous judgment of the Court, but did not agree with its use of strict scrutiny. Id. at 383 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). See note 100 and accompanying text infra.
98. 403 U.S. at 371.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 371-72. The Court stated that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'dis-
crete and insular' minority." Id. at 372, quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The Court also analogized to race and nationality, two other suspect
classes. 403 U.S. at 372.
101. 403 U.S. at 372-73 & n.9, citing Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding
city ordinance which prohibited issuance of licenses for billiard rooms to aliens); Terrace v.
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The Court then proceeded to discuss federal-state relations in this area
of the law, observing that the federal government has broad powers over
naturalization and immigration and, therefore, over aliens. 10 3 The question
of congressional authority to make classifications similar to those in Graham
was expressly reserved. 10 4
Two years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Graham holding in
two separate decisions. The first of these cases was Sugarman v.
Dougall. 105 Sugarman involved a challenge to a provision of the New York
Civil Service Law 10 6 which exiuded aliens from competitive positions except
in rare instances. 10 7  The Court initially noted that it was only addressing
New York's indiscriminate exclusion of aliens from all public employ-
ment.' 08 The Court determined that "classifications based on alienage are
'subject to close judicial scrutiny.' " 109 Noting the broad discriminatory in--
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding state statute which disqualified aliens from owning
land unless they made a good faith declaration of intention to become citizens); Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (sustaining constitutionality of New York statute prohibiting employ-
ment of aliens on public works projects).
102. 403 U.S. at 372-76. Arizona and Pennsylvania argued that the states had a special in-
terest, in favoring citizens over aliens. Id. at 372. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning
that it was inconsistent with the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 374. The Court also rejected the
argument that welfare benefits were simply a "privilege" rather than a "right" and that their
denial was therefore not to be accorded constitutional protection. Id. Finally, the Court rejected
the states' contention that because of limited welfare resources, it was necessary to exclude
aliens in order to maintain the "fiscal integrity" of its programs. Id. at 374-75.
103. Id. at 376-80.
104. Id. at 382 n.14. The Court stated: "We have no occasion to decide whether Congress,
in the exercise of the immigration and naturalization power, could enact a statute imposing on
aliens a uniform nationwide residency requirement as a condition of federally funded welfare
benefits." Id.
105. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
106. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 53(1) (McKinney 1973).
107. 413 U.S. at 635. The only exception to the prohibition allowed temporary employment
of aliens if the department head or appointing authority determined that there was an "acute
shortage of employees . . . in any particular class or classes of positions by reason of a lack of a
sufficient number of qualified personnel available for recruitment." Id. at 635 n.1, quoting N.Y.
CIv. SERV. LAW § 53(2) (McKinney 1973). The alien, however, could only continue his
employment until it was determined that a shortage no longer existed. 413 U.S. at 635.
108. 413 U.S. at 638-39. The Court indicated that it was not asked to address the question of
a particular individual's right to public employment. Id. The Court also noted that the state did
have an interest in defining its political community, and in limiting participation in governing
positions to those within that community. Id. at 642-43. The Court held, however, that "in
seeking to achieve this substantial purpose, with discrimination against aliens, the means the
State employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose." Id. at 643.
Therefore, the Court indicated that it was not addressing a classification which barred aliens
from "closely defined and limited classes of public employment." Id. at 639.
109. Id. at 642, quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The Court also
quoted Graham when it observed that aliens as a class "are a prime example of a 'discrete and
insular' minority." Id. It was never explicitly stated in Sugarman, however, that the Court was
designating aliens as a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny. But cf. Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (where Court explicitly categorized classifications based on alienage
with those based on race and nationality, two traditional suspect classifications). See note 100
and accompanying text supra. The Sugarman Court never used the terms "strict scrutiny" or
"suspect class," nor did it cite to cases involving other suspect classes as it had in Graham.
Instead, it required that the classification be subject to "close judicial scrutiny." 413 U.S. at
642.
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pact of the statute, 110 as well as the lack of any substantial justification for
the classification,"' the Court found the statute unconstitutional." 1 2
The second case was In re Griffiths. 113 Griffiths involved a challenge
to a Connecticut state court regulation 114 which excluded aliens from the
practice of law. The majority stated that "classifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect." 115 Requir-
ing a "substantial" 116 justification, the Court found that Connecticut had not
sustained its burden, 11 7 and held that the exclusion of aliens from the bar
violated the equal protection clause. 118
In 1976, the Supreme Court was confronted with challenges to a federal
statute and a federal regulation which were directly analagous to the state
provisions at issue in Graham and Sugarman. The results, however, were
quite different.
It may also be significant that in testing the statute, the Court made reference to the "sub-
stantiality of the State's interest." Id. Traditionally, when strict scrutiny has been applied, a
"compelling interest" has been required. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. Since the
statute at issue in Sugarman was found unconstitutional, it is not clear whether this choice of
language by the Court indicated that it was applying a more deferential test than strict scrutiny.
This question may have been answered in Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978). For a
discussion of Foley, see notes 138-54 and accompanying text infra. In Foley, the -Supreme
Court, applying a rational basis test, upheld the exclusion of resident aliens from the New York
state police force. 98 S. Ct. at 1073. Although Sugarman was distinguished, Foley clearly dem-
onstrated that classifications based on alienage are not always suspect and, therefore, do not
always trigger strict scrutiny. 1d. at 1070. Moreover, the Court has also expressly indicated that
it does not consider the use of the term "substantial interest" rather than "compelling interest"
to be significant. See note 116 infra.
110. 413 U.S. at 643. The Court found the statute "neither narrowly confined nor precise in
its application" as the provision applied indiscriminately to sanitation workers and typists as well
as to top level policymakers. Id.
111. Id. at 643-46. The Court again rejected the assertion of a state's special interest in
favoring its citizens. Id. See note 102 supra.
112. 413 U.S. at 646. The Court did not discuss possible conflicts between the state law and
congressional regulation of immigration and naturalization as it had in Graham. Id. See notes
103 & 104 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent to Sugarman and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
For a discussion of Griffiths, see notes 113-18 and accompanying text infra. Justice Rehnquist
interpreted the majority opinion as designating aliens as a suspect class. 413 U.S. at 649 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the only suspect class should be race. Id. at
649-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also noted that the Constitution itself rec-
ognizes differences between aliens and citizens. Id. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives must be citizens); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3
(Senators must be citizens); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("citizens" entitled to all "Privileges
and Immunities"). Asserting that the rational basis test should apply, Justice Rehnquist would
have found the statutes constitutional. 413 U.S. at 653-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
114. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK rule 8(1) (1963).
115. 413 U.S. at 721, quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). It is interest-
ing to note this explicit statement made by the Griffiths Court in light of the absence of a
similar statement in Sugarman. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
116. 413 U.S. at 722. As in Sugarman, the Court characterized the requisite state interest as
"substantial." Id. See note 109 supra. In Griffiths, however, the Court noted that the mag-
nitude of the state's interest has also been characterized as "'overriding,' ... 'compelling,' . ..
'important,' . . . or 'substantial,'" 413 U.S. at 722 n.9 (citations omitted). The Court
stated: "We attribute no particular significance to these variations in diction." Id.
117. 413 U.S.at 722.
118. Id. at 729.
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In Mathews v. Diaz,119 the Court reviewed a federal medical insurance
program which excluded aliens unless they satisfied a residency requirement
and had been admitted for permanent residence in the United States. 120 The
statutory conditions were substantially similar to those found unconstitutional
in Graham. 121 Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded
that while the fifth amendment due process clause was applicable, it did not
prohibit all classifications of aliens.12 2 Noting the broad power of Congress
over naturalization and immigration, 123 the Court determined that not all
disparate treatment of aliens is unconstitutional. 124  Finding that the case
did not present a question of discrimination between citizens and aliens, but
rather between classes of aliens, 1 25 the Court applied the rationality test,12 6
and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 1 27  Graham was distin-
guished solely on the grounds that it involved a state statute. 1 28
The second case, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,1 29 involved a Civil Serv-
ice Commission regulation which barred all noncitizens from competitive
federal civil service positions.130 The provision challenged in Hampton was
directly analagous to the state statute invalidated in Sugarman. 13' A sharply
divided Court 132 found the regulation unconstitutional on due process
grounds. 133  It is noteworthy, however, that the Court assumed, without
deciding, that Congress or the President could have excluded aliens from
the federal service. 134
The Hampton Court based its decision on two major factors. First, the
majority found that the Civil Service Commission was not responsible for
promoting the interests which it asserted in justification of the regula-
119. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
120. Id. at 70. The statute attacked was 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (1976). 426 U.S. at 67. This
provision is part of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976). The durational
residency requirement was five years. Id.§ 1395o(2)(B) (1976).
121. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
122. 426 U.S. at 77-80. It is interesting to note that while the Court found that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment was applicable, it did not specifically mention equal
protection, although it did refer generally to the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 77.
123. Id. at 79-80.
124. Id. at 77-80.
125. Id. at 80. For an explanation of the classification, see text accompanying note 120 supra.
126. 426 U.S. at 81-84.
127. Id. at 87.
128. Id. at 84-85. The Court, in finding the equal protection argument which had been suc-
cessful in Graham inapplicable, stated: "The equal protection analysis . . . involves significantly
different considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States
rather than between aliens and the Federal Government."' Id.
129. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
130. Id. at 90. See 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1978).
131. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
132. Hampton was a 5-4 decision. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Powell joined. Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White and Blackmun.
133. 426 U.S. at 116-17.
134. Id. at 105. The Court also noted that its holding did not preclude the use of citizenship
as a qualification for certain policymaking positions. Id. at 101 & n.20.
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tion.135  Second, since Congress and the President were responsible for the
admission of aliens to the country, the Court concluded that due process
required that decisions which deprive aliens of an important liberty interest
be made at a comparable level of government. 13 6 The dissent criticized the
majority for enunciating "a novel conception" of due process and for disre-
garding the narrow standard of review appropriate in the area of federal
policy with regard to aliens. 1
37
Finally, in 1978 the Court decided Foley v. Connelie.138  Foley in-
volved a challenge to a state statute which barred aliens from becoming New
York state troopers. 139  The majority 140 initially determined that although
the Court will closely scrutinize restraints by the states on aliens, 1 4 1 not all
such restrictions are suspect. 142 The Foley majority attempted to distin-
guish all of the Court's prior decisions in which state discrimination against
aliens had been invalidated.143 The Court recognized the "State's historical
power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institu-
tions in order to preserve the basic conception of a political commu-
nity." 144 This exclusionary power was interpreted as allowing the restriction
of access to positions involving "discretionary decisionmaking or execution of
135. Id. at 104-14. The majority also rejected the assertion of an administrative conveniencejustification. Id. at 115-16. Justice Stevens further reasoned that when an "overriding national
interest" is asserted to justify a discriminatory rule, "due process requires that there be a
legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest." Id. at
103.
136. Id. at 116.
137. Id. at 117-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist maintained that the majority
had "'inexplicably meld[ed] together the concepts of equal protection and procedural and sub-
stantive due process." Id. at 119 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the
majority's "delegation" analysis, referring to the Court's holding that since aliens are admitted to
the United States by the authority of Congress and the President, the decision to deprive them
of an important liberty interest must be made at the same level of government. Id. at 123-26
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 136 supra. Finally, Justice Rehnquist
relied on the Court's traditional deference in the area of federal policy with regard to aliens in
concluding that the regulation was valid. 426 U.S. at 117-19, 126-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978).
139. Id. at 1069. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978).
140. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger. He was joined by Justices
Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist.
141. 98 S. Ct. at 1070.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1070-71. It was determined that the classifications previously invalidated "struck
at the noncitizens' ability to exist in the community." Id. at 1070. Graham was distinguished as
having involved the exclusion of aliens from welfare benefits, which were determined to be
essential to the maintenance of life. Id. Sugarman was considered to have involved the elimina-
tion of aliens from eligibility for a broad range of public employment. Id. Nyquist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977), struck down the exclusion of aliens from educational benefits, which, accord-
ing to the Court, were a necessity in modern society. 98 S. Ct. at 1070. The majority noted that
Griffiths involved the exclusion of aliens from the practice of law, id., and that Examining Bd.
v. Flores de Otera, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), involved the exclusion of aliens from the practice of a
licensed profession. 98 S. Ct. at 1070. In contrast to these prohibitions, the Court concluded
that the classification challenged in Foley did not affect the alien's ability to exist in the coin-
munity. Id. at 1070-71.
144. 98 S. Ct. at 1070, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647-48 (1973).
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policy, which substantially affects members of the political community." 141
Applying these principles to the challenged provision, the Court concluded
that the rational relationship test was appropriate 1 46 and that it had been
satisfied. 147
Justice Stewart wrote a concurring opinion in which he questioned the
validity of prior decisions concerning aliens. 148  Justice Blackmun, concur-
ring in the result,' 49 maintained that the rational basis test was applicable
solely because New York had "vested its state troopers with powers and
duties that are basic to the function of state government.' 150 He agreed
with the majority that the statute was constitutional under this level of
scrutiny. 151
The dissenters 152 disagreed with the majority on several grounds. They
considered the result to be inconsistent with prior decisions of the Court, 153
and disagreed with the majority's conclusion that state troopers were in-




An examination of the foregoing decisions reveals that, at the least, con-
gressional legislation is more frequently sustained in the face of equal protec-
tion challenges than state legislation. Several theories may help to explain
this trend. First, the due process requirements of the fifth amendment may
not be as stringent as the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth
amendment, indicating that there is not total incorporation of equal protec-
tion principles. 155 Secondly, there may be a special deference shown by the
145. 98 S. Ct. at 1071.
146. Id. at 1070-71. The Court stated:
The practical consequence of this theory is that "our scrutiny will not be so demand-
ing where we deal with matters firmly within a States' constitutional prerogatives .... "
The State need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification.
Id. at 1070, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
147. 98 S. Ct. at 1073.
148. Id. at 1073 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart maintained that it was difficult to
reconcile the Foley holding with the reasoning of prior decisions. Id.
149. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1074 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was careful to reiterate that
Linder other circumstances, classifications of aliens would be suspect. Id. at 1073 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). He maintained that the lesser scrutiny was appropriate only because Foley involved
a state's constitutional power to establish its government and to define eligibility for participa-
tion therein. Id. at 1073-74 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 1073-74 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
152. justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Brennan.
Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined.
153. 98 S. Ct. at 1074-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 1077-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens had particular difficulty reconciling Foley with Griffiths since he was unable to
understand why police should receive greater protection from the state than lawyers. Id. at
1077 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1075-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 1077-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. For a discussion of this theory, see notes 159-70 and accompanying text infra.
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Supreme Court to a coequal branch of government. 156 Thirdly, the federal
government may have different, more compelling interests to offer in justifi-
cation of its statutes than do the states. 1 57  Finally, it is possible that the
cases are distinguishable on the basis of factors other than the federal-state
distinction. 1 58  Of course, consideration must be given to the possibility that
a combination of these theories is necessary to adequately explain the recent
trend.
A. Total Incorporation?
The fifth amendment contains no explicit equal protection clause. 159 It
is clear, however, that the federal government is now subject to some equal
protection restrictions since the fifth amendment guarantee of due process
incorporates at least some degree of equal protection., 6 0  The question,
prompted by some cryptic language in Bolling, 161 is whether due process
encompasses the entire spectrum of equal protection restrictions.
It should be noted that Boling involved a racial classification. 16 2  The
decision in that case was grounded upon the premise that some forms of
discrimination, such as discrimination based on race, could be so invidious as
to violate both due process and equal protection.16 3  Since classifications
other than race have since been held to constitute invidious discrimina-
tion,' " it is now clear that the Boling incorporation principle was not lim-
ited to racial classifications.
Subsequent discussion of the incorporation question by the Court has
not served to clarify the issue. Various Justices have suggested that the due
156. For a discussion of this theory, see notes 171-81 and accompanying text infra.
157. For a discussion of this theory, see notes 182-97 and accompanying text infra.
158. For a discussion of this theory, see notes 198-206 and accompanying text infra.
159. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
160. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
161. For the relevant language in Bolling, see note 5 supra.
162. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. In fact, Boiling has often been cited in support
of the proposition that race is a suspect class or that racial classifications constitute invidious
discrimination. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). The first time Bolling was cited by the Supreme Court was with
respect to this aspect of its holding. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958). The Cooper
Court stated: "'The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so
maintained [publicly] is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept
of due process of law." Id. at 19, citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling has since
been cited in support of this proposition on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 721 & n.7 (1963).
163. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
164. In some circumstances, sex discrimination has been found to be invidious. See Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Also, discrimination between native born citizens and
naturalized citizens has been considered invidious. See Schneder v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
Some discrimination against illegitimates has been held to be invidious. See notes 33-45, 54-60
& 70-83 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, some discrimination against aliens has been
held to be invidious. See notes 94-118 & 129-37 and accompanying text supra. In these last two
categories, the question at the federal level is whether the discrimination is sufficiently invidi-
ous to violate due process.
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process guarantees are not equivalent to those of equal protection. 165  On
the other hand, there has been some language suggesting total incorpora-
tion. 166
There also seems to be some disagreement in the lower federal courts
concerning this issue. A number of the lower courts have maintained that
there has been total incorporation. 167 Other courts, however, have noted
that due process and equal protection restrictions against discrimination are
not necessarily equivalent. 168
Despite this ambiguity, however, this factor does not appear to have
had controlling significance. Apparently, the Court has not yet refused to
consider an equal protection challenge to federal action based on this argu-
165. This position has been expressed in a variety of ways. In Schneder v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163 (1964), the Court stated that "while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."'
Id. at 168, quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). More recent expressions in-
clude that of Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969). Chief Justice Warren noted that there was no requirement of uniformity of treat-
ment of different groups when Congress acted under the commerce power. Id. at 652 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting), citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940);
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1939). The Chief Justice concluded that the incorporation
principle of Bolling did not apply in the area of social or economic welfare legislation or, at
most, that it dictated the application of a loose rationality test. 394 U.S. at 652-53 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Douglas has also perceived some difference between the two constitu-
tional provisions. In his dissent in Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), Justice Douglas
asserted that he would employ the same analysis under either amendment, but cited Bolling as
supporting a different proposition. Id. at 90 & n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his dissenting
opinion in Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971), Justice Douglas stated: "The overlap is, of
course, not total." Id. at 279 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting), citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
166. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Court found strict scrutiny appro-
priate where there was an infringement of voting rights, the Court stated: "Equal Protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 93, citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Justice Brennan expressed a similar view in dictum in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974). Writing for the majority in a decision upholding the exclusion of conscientious objectors
from a veterans' educational benefits program, he stated: "[]f a classification would be invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with
the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 364 n.4.
167. See, e.g., Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268, 272 n.5 (2d Cir.
1976) (classification of aliens invalid under the fourteenth amendment is also invalid under the
fifth amendment); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976 (5th Cir. 1975) (due
process equivalent to equal protection in the context of classification of aliens); NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614, 619 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) (if a classification is invalid under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is also inconsistent with the due process requirements of
the fifth amendment); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 594 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S.
1069 (1972) (three-judge court relied on Boiling in applying Weber to the federal government).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 404 F. Supp. 273, 275 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 523
F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1975) (federal statutes do not have to be nationally uniform in their applica-
tion to the states); United States v. An Yun, 371 F. Supp. 668 (D. Hawaii 1974) (not every
discrimination rises to the level of denial of due process under the fifth amendment).
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ment,'6 9 and such challenges have been upheld in a variety of contexts. 170
This may, however, be one factor explaining the greater deference accorded
federal action.
B. Deference to a Coequal Branch
Under the federalist system as established by the United States Con-
stitution, the federal government is superior to that of the states. 171 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court, the President, and Congress comprise the
three coequal branches of the federal government. 1 72  This distribution of
power cannot be ignored in considering a pattern of decisions in constitu-
tional law.
Due to the nature of our tripartite system, the Supreme Court has tra-
ditionally exercised a degree of deference towards the other branches of the
federal government. 173 This same degree of deference may not be accorded
the states, as exemplified by a remark of Justice Holmes, who stated: "I do
not think the United States would come to an end if we [the Supreme
Court] lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the
laws of the several States." 174
The Court's deferential approach in reviewing the activity of a coequal
branch has been exhibited in numerous contexts. An early example was the
broad interpretation given the "necessary and proper clause" 175 in
169. Indeed, an examination of the illegitimacy and the alien decisions reveals that the only
time the Court questioned the appropriateness of engaging in an equal protection analysis was
in Labine, which involved a challenge to state action. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
170. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (aliens); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex); Davis v. Richardson, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (illegitimates);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (race).
When the federal government has exercised its constitutional authority over the District of
Columbia, the Court has treated the due process clause as the equivalent of the equal protec-,
tion clause. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For the D.C. Circuit's treatment of
this issue, see Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957-58 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975), revd on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
171. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This article provides in pertinent part:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, tinder the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. It should be noted, however, that although the federal government is supreme, its powers
are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. All other
powers are reserved to the states. Id.
172. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1, II, III. See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 81.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (discussing traditional deference
of Court to President despite enforcing a subpoena issued to the President); Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939) (Supreme Court would defer to Congress on questions of the timing of
ratification of constitutional amendments); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936) (deference to Congress and the President in the area of foreign affairs). See also
notes 175-80 and accompanying text infro.
174. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295 (1920).
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause provides in pertinent part: "The Congress
shall have Power ...To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
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McCulloch v. Maryland. 176 Supreriie Court decisions interpreting the scope
of Congress' power under the "commerce clause" 177 also reveal a deferential
approach by the Court.178  The same deference has also been demonstrated
in areas ranging from eminent domain 179 to the fundamental right of access
to the courts.' 80 While this factor obviously does not explain all of the
Court's equal protection decisions, it must nevertheless be considered.''
C. A Difference in Justifying Interests
This theory, on its face, appears to have substantial merit. Congress
must confront larger national problems and deal with a more heterogeneous
population than state legislatures. At the same time, the federal government,
as the supreme sovereign, has been constitutionally granted numerous pow-
ers, such as authority to determine foreign policy and jurisdiction over mat-
ters involving immigration and naturalization, which have been denied to
the states.' 8 2  The latter factor makes this theory especially attractive in
explaining the cases dealing with aliens.
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States ..... Id.
176. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). McCulloch involved a challenge by the state of Maryland
to the chartering of the Second Bank of the United States. Id. at 316-18. In concluding that the
"necessary and proper" clause authorized Congress to charter the bank, Justice Marshall stated:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say
that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is
really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which cir-
cumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court dis-
claims all pretensions to such a power.
Id. at 423.
177. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. This clause provides in pertinent part: "'The Congress
shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several
States ..... Id.
178. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In his concurring opinion in Youngstown,
Justice Jackson described the scope of judicial review when Congress and the President act in
conjunction: "A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,
and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." 343 U.S. at 637
(Jackson, J., concurring).
179. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that congressional declaration of
public purpose is virtually conclusive in eminent domain cases).
180. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that states could not
constitutionally bar indigents from divorce courts through the use of a required fee) with United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding the right of Congress to require a filing fee from
indigents in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings).
181. For example, consider the deference shown in the illegitimacy context. Compare Trim-
ble v. Gordon,..430 U.S. 762 (1977) (state statute found unconstitutional) with Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1977) (federal statute found constitutional). For a discussion of Trimble and Fiallo, see
notes 70-93 and accompanying text supra.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress is also given plenary power over bank-
ruptcies. Id. Furthermore, only the federal government may enter into a treaty with a foreign
nation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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A close examination of the decisions, however, does not support this
simple analysis. For example, the cases involving aliens appear to have been
decided on the basis of different levels of judicial scrutiny, rather than on a
consideration of the various governmental interests in the application of the
tests.18 3  Since the Court could have reached the same results if it had
employed a uniform test to review each classification but had considered the
differing governmental interests in applying that particular test,184 its use of
the various tests must be considered significant. It is submitted that this
clearly indicates a departure from traditional equal protection analysis. While
governmental interests remain as viable considerations, they are no longer
considered as mere justifications in the application of the test, but rather as
determinative factors in the choice of the test itself.
A further problem is the isolation of the different federal or state in-
terests involved. The most obvious of these interests is the national power
over immigration and naturalization. 18 5 One commentator has suggested
that this federal interest may provide an explanation for the decisions involv-
ing classifications of aliens.18 6 Foley, however, apparently precludes such a
183. In Graham, Sugarman, and Griffiths, the Court engaged in an intense scrutiny of the
statutes and found the provisions unconstitutional. See notes 94-118 and accompanying text
supra. In Diaz and Foley, the Court applied a rational basis test and found the statutes constitu-
tional. See notes 119-28 & 138-54 and accompanying text supra. See generally Comment, Aliens'
Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 835, 838-57 (1977).
184. Under the early decisions involving challenges to state action, classifications based on
alienage were considered to be inherently suspect. See notes 100 & 115 and accompanying text
supra. See also note 109 and accompanying text supra. It is thus assumed that strict scrutiny
may have been employed as the uniform standard of review. Under strict scrutiny, a statute will
withstand judicial review only if it is supported by a compelling governmental interest. See note
18 and accompanying text supra. Applying this analysis, the statutes challenged in Graham,
Sugarman, and Griffiths were found to be unconstitutional. See notes 94-118 and accompanying
text supra.
In Diaz, where the Court upheld the constitutionality of the challenged provision, the
federal interest in encouraging aliens to become citizens could have been found to be compel-
ling, considering the plenary power of Congress in this area. For a discussion of Diaz, see notes
119-28 and accompanying text supra. Such a compelling interest would have enabled the statute
to withstand even strict scrutiny.
In Hampton, the civil service regulations were invalidated. For a discussion of Hampton,
see notes 129-37 and accompanying text supra. Although it is unclear whether or not Hampton
rested on equal protection grounds, the Court did employ some equal protection analysis. See
notes 134 & 135 and accompanying text supra. In so doing, the Court rejected the assertion of
any interest which may have been considered to be compelling. See note 135 and accompanying
text supra. Hampton would therefore not have withstood strict scrutiny, and the regulations at
issue would still have been found unconstitutional under this hypothetical analysis.
Even the provision challenged in Foley would probably have withstood strict scrutiny. The
Court in Sugarman noted that a state has a compelling interest in insuring that citizens control
the key policymaking positions in the state government. See note 108 and accompanying text
supra. The Foley Court could have found that the state government delegated a portion of its
policymaking role to the state police. Indeed, this was Justice Blackmun's position in his con-
curring opinion. See note 150 and accompanying text supra. The Court may thus have found
that the state had a compelling interest supporting its exclusion of aliens from the state police
force.
185. The Court explicitly discussed this federal power in a number of decisions. See notes
103-04, 123 & 134 and accompanying text supra.
186. See Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National
Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275. This commentator summarized the Court's position as
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simple analysis. Foley rested on the state's interest in reserving "policymak-
ing and executing" positions for citizens.'8 7 While the parameters of this
interest are currently unclear, 18 8 it is apparently one shared both by the
states and the federal government.'l 9
The illegitimacy classification decisions do not provide any greater sup-
port for this theory. In Fiallo, the classification had been made in an immi-
gration context, 190 and thus the decision could be explained by Congress'
plenary power in this area. 191 The statute in Lucas, however, was justified
by "administrative convenience," 192 an interest no more important to Con-
gress than to the state governments. 193  Furthermore, in comparing Fiallo
with Trimble, one again finds the utilization of different tests on the federal
and state levels. 194
It is possible, of course, that the relative magnitude of the problems
confronting the federal and state governments may make a significant differ-
ence to the Court in its determination of the strengths of the interests as-
serted. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 195 a recent
affirmative action case arising in the racial context, 196 the Court noted in
dictum that Congress would have greater latitude in its efforts to remedy
past discrimination than would some smaller governmental bodies. 197
"preferring the proposition that the federal government has plenary power to the proposition
that alienage classifications are suspect. The apparent result is that all or nearly all challenged
state statutes must fall, but all federal statutes will apparently survive." Id. at 276-77.
187. See text accompanying note 145 supra,
188. State police apparently fall within the scope of this interest, while lawyers do not. Com-
pare Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978) with In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). For a
discussion of Foley and Griffiths, see notes 113-18 & 138-54 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Stevens noted this anomaly in his dissent in Foley. See note 153 and accompanying text
supra.
189. Foley involved state action. See note 139 and accompanying text supra. In Hampton,
which involved the federal civil service, the Court also noted that aliens could be excluded from
top level policymaking positions. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
190. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
191. Indeed, this was the way in which the Fiallo dissenters perceived the Court's holding.
See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
192. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
193. It may be argued that since the national government is much larger than the govern-
ment of any individual state, it has a greater interest in administrative convenience. This subtle
argument has yet to be recognized by the Court.
194. In Fiallo, the Court applied a very deferential minimum scrutiny test. See note 89 and
accompanying text supra. In contrast, the Court in Trimble employed "minimum scrutiny with
bite." See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
195. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
196. Id. at 2733-48. The Medical School at the University of California at Davis had insti-
tuted an affirmative action program by reserving a specific number of positions in each class for
minority students. Id. at 2740-42.
197. Id. at 2755 n.41. The Court stated:
[W]e are not here presented with an occasion to review legislation by Congress pur-
suant to its powers under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy the effects of prior discrimination . . . . We have previously rec-
ognized the special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the effects of
identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority to take appropriate remedial
measures.
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D. Other Distinguishing Factors
It is highly unlikely that any one factor, such as the federal-state distinc-
tion, provides an adequate explanation for all of the Court's decisions in the
equal protection area. Indeed, a review of the cases concerning aliens and
illegitimates dispels any hope of such a simple explanation.198 Additional
factors are obviously being considered by the Court.
The most readily apparent factor is the nature of the group against
whom the discrimination has occurred. 199 Racial classifications are sus-
pect. 200  Classifications of aliens may be suspect. 20 1  Illegitimacy classifica-
tions invoke minimum scrutiny with bite.20 2  Sex classifications generally
invoke minimum scrutiny. 20 3
Another factor may be the presence or absence of an "insurmountable
barrier" or a "total shutout." This factor has been explicitly relied on by the
Court 20 4 but has also been expressly rejected in one instance. 20 5  The im-
portance of the right or interest infringed may also be a consideration. 206
V. RAMIFICATIONS-WHAT WILL THE FUTURE HOLD?
It is submitted that the foregoing discussion leads to two conclusions.
First, the due process clause of the fifth amendment does impose some
equal protection restraints on the federal government. 20 7 Secondly, the
level of governmental action under review, whether federal or state, while
not dispositive, does influence the Court's equal protection analysis.
20 8
It is suggested that this difference indicates a significant departure from
traditional equal protection doctrine. Traditional equal protection analysis
198. For example, in Hampton, a federal regulation was found to be unconstitutional. See
notes 129-37 and accompanying text supra. On the other hand, in Foley, a state classification
was found to be constitutional. See notes 138-54 and accompanying text supra.
199. This was one of the factors noted by Justice Marshall in his "sliding scale" approach. See
note 26 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 13-14 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
201. This was the Court's position in Graham and Griffiths. See notes 100 & 115 and accom-
panying text supra. This is not true, however, at the federal level, see notes 119-37 and accom-
panying text supra, and is not always true on the state level. See notes 138-54 and accompany-
ing text supra. For a discussion of the erosion of suspect status for classification of aliens, see
generally Comment, supra note 183, at 838-48.
202. This was the Court's position in Trimble. See notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text
supra. In Fiallo, however, the Court did not add much "bite" to its minimum scrutiny. See
note 89 and accompanying text supra. For one commentator's analysis of the level of scrutiny
employed in Fiallo, see Rosberg, supra note 186, at 318-27.
203. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(plurality applying strict scrutiny to sex classification).
204. See note 47 supra; note 56 and accompanying text supra.
205. See note 80 supra.
206. This is clear in the "fundamental rights" line of decisions. See note 17 and accompanying
text supra. It hlso appears in other contexts, however. The Foley Court distinguished prior
decisions concerning classifications of aliens on the ground that those classifications affected the
aliens' ability to exist in the community, whereas exclusion from the state police force was
determined to fall outside that line of cases. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
207. See notes 4 & 160 and accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 27-197 and accompanying text supra..
COMMENT
25
Siedzikowski: Federalism and a New Equal Protection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
was basically a two-step approach. First, the appropriate test was deter-
mined.20 9 This was a fairly mechanical process, with the level of scrutiny
being determined by the nature of the class discriminated against or the
nature of the right or interest infringed.210  Certain specified classes and
fundamental rights or interests invoked strict scrutiny, while all other clas-
sifications were subject to some form of a rationality test. 211 The govern-
ment's asserted interests, as well as other factors, were then considered in
applying the tests. 212 Except for some differences over additions to the list
of suspect classes or fundamental rights, 213 the major divisions on the Court
occurred in the application of the test once the appropriate level of scrutiny
had been determined.214
It is submitted that the decisions regarding alienage and illegitimacy
demonstrate a marked change from this approach. The federal-state distinc-
tion appears to be a factor not in applying the appropriate test, but rather in
choosing the test itself.
Perhaps this is most clearly demonstrated by an examination of the vari-
ous opinions of the Justices. The dissenting opinions frequently expressed
disagreement not with the application of the test, but rather with the choice
of the appropriate standard.2 15 Consideration should also be given to the
209. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note
10, at 657-65; Equal Protection, supra note 10; Gunther, supra note 15; Developments, supra
note 15.
210. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra. See generally Bice, supra note 16, at
689-702.
211. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra. See generally Bice, supra note 16, at
698-702.
212. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. See generally Bice, supra note 16, at 689-702.
213. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
214. See, e.g., Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Kotch v. Board of River
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
215. In the early illegitimacy cases such as Levy, the dissenting opinions frequently disagreed
with the majority's application of a particular test. See note 45 supra. Labine also reflected a
disagreement over the application of a commonly accepted test. For a discussion of Labine, see
notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra. Labine, however, may be perceived as marking the
beginning of a new trend by the dissenting Justices-a trend in which they became increasingly
critical of the selection of the standard rather than the application of a particular test by the
majority-in light of the Court's implication that equal protection review :nay not have been
appropriate. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
If not Labine, then Weber marked the beginning of a change, since although the majority
did not enunciate a standard of review, the dissent argued that the rational relationship test had
been satisfied. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra. The dissent in Lucas clearly urged
more than the minimum rationality treatment accorded by the majority. See notes 64-69 and
accompanying text supra. In Trimble, the majority applied minimum rationality with bite, while
the dissenters urged that the traditional deferential rationality test was the appropriate standard
to be applied. See notes 75-83 and accompanying text supra. In Fiallo, the roles were reversed,
with the majority applying a very deferential rationality test, and the dissenters arguing for
closer scrutiny. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
The line of decisions on classifications of aliens reflects this same trend. In Graham, Justice
Harlan, while concurring in the judgment, did not agree with the Court's use of strict scrutiny.
See note 97 supra. In his dissent in Sugarman and Griffiths, Justice Rehnquist argued for the
application of a mere rationality standard. See note 112 supra. In Hampton, the dissenters again
argued for a more deferential test. See note 137 and accompanying text supra. In Foley, the
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opinions of Justice Powell in Trimble and Fiallo.2 1 6  Despite his obvious
sympathy in Trimble for the plight of illegitimates, 217 Justice Powell was
willing to apply a very deferential rationality test in Fiallo.218  Such an ap-
proach would be an anomaly in traditional equal protection analysis, where
the level of scrutiny would be determined by the nature of the class against
which the discrimination occurred.
The cases concerning aliens provide another striking example of a trend
in which a multitude of factors influence the determination of the appro-
priate test to be applied by the Court. The early cases utilized strict scrutiny
in reviewing state legislation, but applied a deferential minimum rationality
test for challenges to federal classifications.2 19  The Foley decision merely
carried this trend to its logical conclusion. Since Graham had established
that aliens were a suspect class on the state level,2 20 traditional equal protec-
tion analysis would have called for the application of strict scrutiny in Foley.
If the Court had wanted to uphold the exclusion of aliens from the New
York state police force, it could have found that the reservation of policy
executing positions to citizens was a compelling interest. The majority, how-
ever, simply applied a more deferential test.22 '
It is suggested that while Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach 222
was a recognition of this new trend in equal protection doctrine, it does not
provide a complete explanation for the Court's decisions. First, under his
approach, the appropriate test is still solely determined by the nature of the
class discriminated against and/or the importance of the interest in-
volved. 223  It is submitted that the federal-state distinction provides at least
a third factor to be considered. Secondly, his approach suffers from the same
ambiguity for which he criticized the Court.2 24  Under Justice Marshall's
theory, there are a number of variables, explicit and implicit, which, in a
way not fully explained, affect the level of scrutiny chosen.2 2 5 Moreover,
Justice Marshall has not clearly indicated the number of different tests that
majority applied a minimum rationality test, while the dissent urged that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard. See notes 146-54 and accompanying text supra.
Differences with respect to the choice of the test to be applied occasionally appeared in the
Court's earlier decisions. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (majority applying strict
scrutiny to a restriction on the right to travel while dissent urged that with respect to the
federal government in the District of Columbia, only a loose rationality test should be applied).
216. See notes 73 & 86 supra.
217. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
218. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 94-137 and accompanying text supra.
220. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 140-47 and accompanying text supra.
222. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
223. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 109-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). justice Marshall stated: "In truth, the Court
itself will be open to the criticism raised by the majority so long as it continues on its present
course of effectively selecting in private which cases will be afforded special consideration with-
out acknowledging the true basis of its action." Id. (footnote omitted).
225. See id. at 98-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
COMMENT
27
Siedzikowski: Federalism and a New Equal Protection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [
the Court should utilize. 226 It is submitted that the three identifiable tests
currently employed by the Court are sufficient. A pure "sliding scale" ap-
proach would make any meaningful understanding of the Court's level of
scrutiny impossible. It is further suggested that the Court should more fully
explain how other factors affect its level of scrutiny, thereby producing a
more consistent equal protection doctrine, understandable to the entire
political community.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most obvious conclusion of any study of equal protection law is that
a state of confusion exists. Several more specific conclusions can nevertheless
be drawn from an examination of the Court's decisions.
On the narrowest level, after Trimble, it seems likely that state classifi-
cations affecting illegitimates will be judicially scrutinized with some degree
of care. 227  Federal classifications of illegitimates do not appear to be in
danger of easy invalidation. 22 8  Classifications of aliens by the federal gov-
ernment appear to be virtually beyond challenge. 229 State classifications of
aliens are subject to attack unless they can be justified by the state's interest
in protecting policymaking or policy executing positions in state govern-
mient. 230
On a broader level, it seems clear that the level of government being
challenged is a relevant factor in current equal protection analysis. It is
suggested that the Court should expressly recognize this factor and define
the scope of its influence.
On the broadest level, it appears that a new equal protection doctrine is
in a state of formation. It is hoped that the Court will recognize this de-
velopment and begin to explain and standardize its various components.
Such an explanation would be extremely helpful to the nation's lawmakers,
federal and state, and to the general political community. It may also indi-
rectly benefit the Court itself, by providing greater public understanding of




227. See notes 70-82 and accompanying text supra.
228. See notes 61-66 & 84-90 and accompanying text supra.
229. See notes 119-37 and accompanying text supra.
230. See notes 94-118 & 138-54 and accompanying text supra.
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